Toggle diff (118 lines)
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index 9f8ce842b6..b9b6ea3ae7 100644
@@ -1078,6 +1078,7 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
%D%/packages/patches/lierolibre-remove-arch-warning.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/lierolibre-try-building-other-arch.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/linkchecker-tests-require-network.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/linux-libre-active-entropy.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/linux-pam-no-setfsuid.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/lirc-localstatedir.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/lirc-reproducible-build.patch \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/linux.scm b/gnu/packages/linux.scm
index 6664620c04..dda95c29ac 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/linux.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/linux.scm
@@ -420,7 +420,8 @@ corresponding UPSTREAM-SOURCE (an origin), using the given DEBLOB-SCRIPTS."
(define-public linux-libre-5.2-source
(source-with-patches linux-libre-5.2-pristine-source
+ (list (search-patch "linux-libre-active-entropy.patch")
%linux-libre-arm-export-__sync_icache_dcache-patch)))
(define-public linux-libre-4.19-source
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/linux-libre-active-entropy.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/linux-libre-active-entropy.patch
index 0000000000..8f081f4a19
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/linux-libre-active-entropy.patch
+Try to actively add entropy instead of waiting forever.
+Fixes <https://bugs.gnu.org/37501>.
+https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/patch/?id=50ee7529ec4500c88f8664560770a7a1b65db72b
+diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
+index 5d5ea4ce1442..2fda6166c1dd 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/random.c
++++ b/drivers/char/random.c
+@@ -1731,6 +1731,56 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
++ * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
++ * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
++ * CPU, the timer activity will be touching the stack of the CPU that is
++ * generating entropy..
++ * Note that we don't re-arm the timer in the timer itself - we are
++ * happy to be scheduled away, since that just makes the load more
++ * complex, but we do not want the timer to keep ticking unless the
++ * entropy loop is running.
++ * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself.
++static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
++ credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, 1);
++ * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can
++ * generate enough entropy with timing noise
++static void try_to_generate_entropy(void)
++ struct timer_list timer;
++ stack.now = random_get_entropy();
++ /* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */
++ if (stack.now == random_get_entropy())
++ timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0);
++ while (!crng_ready()) {
++ if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
++ mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies+1);
++ mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
++ stack.now = random_get_entropy();
++ del_timer_sync(&stack.timer);
++ destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer);
++ mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
+ * Wait for the urandom pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
+ * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
+@@ -1745,7 +1795,17 @@ int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+ if (likely(crng_ready()))
+- return wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready());
++ ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
++ return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
++ try_to_generate_entropy();
++ } while (!crng_ready());
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);