From debbugs-submit-bounces@debbugs.gnu.org Sun Nov 22 18:21:25 2020 Received: (at submit) by debbugs.gnu.org; 22 Nov 2020 23:21:25 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:48534 helo=debbugs.gnu.org) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from ) id 1kgyfc-0004dh-TG for submit@debbugs.gnu.org; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 18:21:25 -0500 Received: from lists.gnu.org ([209.51.188.17]:39152) by debbugs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from ) id 1kgyfa-0004dZ-KG for submit@debbugs.gnu.org; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 18:21:23 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:43282) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kgyfa-00081C-F9 for bug-guix@gnu.org; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 18:21:22 -0500 Received: from dustycloud.org ([50.116.34.160]:35190) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kgyfZ-0001NT-1v for bug-guix@gnu.org; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 18:21:22 -0500 Received: from twig (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by dustycloud.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3D5CF26650 for ; Sun, 22 Nov 2020 18:20:56 -0500 (EST) User-agent: mu4e 1.4.13; emacs 27.1 From: Christopher Lemmer Webber To: bug-guix@gnu.org Subject: Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2020 18:20:28 -0500 Message-ID: <878sat3rnn.fsf@dustycloud.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Received-SPF: pass client-ip=50.116.34.160; envelope-from=cwebber@dustycloud.org; helo=dustycloud.org X-Spam_score_int: -18 X-Spam_score: -1.9 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.9 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-Spam-Score: -1.3 (-) X-Debbugs-Envelope-To: submit X-BeenThere: debbugs-submit@debbugs.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: debbugs-submit-bounces@debbugs.gnu.org Sender: "Debbugs-submit" X-Spam-Score: -2.3 (--) Okay, I just realized I left a friend vulnerable by guiding them through a Guix graphical install and telling them it would give them a decent setup. They turned on openssh support. Then I realized their config had password-authentication? on. That's unacceptable. We need to change this default. This is known to leave users open to attack, and selecting a password secure enough against brute forcing is fairly difficult, much more difficult than only allowing entry by keys. Plus, few distributions do what we're doing anymore, precisely because of wanting to be secure by default. Yes, I know some people want password authentication on as part of a bootstrapping process. Fine... those users know to put it on. Let's not leave our users open to attack by default though. Happy to produce a patch and change the documentation, but I'd like to hear that we have consensus to make this change. But we should, because otherwise else I think we're going to hurt users. - Chris